Why Liberal Democracy May Never Work in Nigeria

 

By Teslim Oyetunji 

Theoretically, democracy is the most popular form of government in the world today. On paper, it promises to yield the most dividends for countries that adopt it. While it has worked excellently in some countries, delivering prosperity, innovation, and material progress, the story has not been the same for many others who embraced it wholesale. One such country is Nigeria. But the proper question to ask is: is it really democracy that has failed—or is it Nigerians themselves?

Democracy is identifiable by two distinct features: free and fair elections conducted on the basis of inclusive adult suffrage and a multi-party system. These are supposed to provide the framework for participatory governance and periodic change in leadership through the ballot. However, democracy ensures that the majority wins and retains power; by its nature, it can lead to the tyranny of the majority and, in extreme cases, the abuse of power. It can perpetuate bad governance and lock a country in a cycle of stagnation. Democracy without institutional checks can be disastrous.

In such a majoritarian dictatorship, the incumbent’s only task is to secure the numbers—by any means necessary. In the absence of institutional checks such as a truly independent electoral body, an empowered civil society, firm legal frameworks, and a functioning judiciary to punish electoral offenses like vote-rigging, bribery, and voter intimidation, democracy becomes a farce. It offers an infinite number of loopholes for political actors to manipulate outcomes while retaining the veneer of legitimacy.

Fareed Zakaria, in his influential book The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (2003), made a profound distinction between democracy and "constitutional liberalism." He argued that democracy as a mere mechanism of popular election is not sufficient to guarantee freedom, rights, or good governance. Europe, Zakaria explained, developed constitutional liberalism over centuries—emphasizing the rule of law, separation of powers, and individual rights—before embracing mass democracy. In contrast, many African nations, including Nigeria, skipped this evolutionary process and plunged headlong into electoral democracy without first building liberal institutions. The result, Zakaria warns, is what he calls "illiberal democracy," where governments are elected but remain fundamentally autocratic.

Indeed, Nigeria falls squarely in this category. The history of its democracy, ever since it was first tested in 1966, has been deeply flawed. The 1964 and 1965 elections were particularly notorious for grave electoral violations and violence, especially in the southwestern part of the country. The North, on its part, was accused of manipulating census figures.

The 1983 elections continued on the same ignoble path. The re-election of President Shehu Shagari was based on what many regarded as a "curious mathematical interpretation" of the constitutional requirement for a spread of votes. Legal manipulation replaced electoral integrity.

The 1993 presidential election stands out as the most credible in the country's history. Conducted by the military under General Babangida, it was widely hailed as free and fair. The presumed winner, M.K.O. Abiola, was never sworn in, and the election was annulled, throwing the country into crisis. In recent years, the decline has been even more brazen. Elections are now conducted shorn of all pretences—no longer even the formality of fairness. Winners are often known well in advance. It is no longer an election but a selection.

There are indeed many reasons why liberal democracy may never work in Nigeria. First, the entire idea of democracy and its wholesale implementation has never been organic nor properly understood. The centuries-old philosophical theories that underpin it—such as the doctrine of separation of powers espoused in Montesquieu's The Spirit of Laws (1748), A.V. Dicey's work on the rule of law, the social contract theories of Rousseau and Locke, and the American Federalist Papers co-authored by Madison—have never been truly appreciated or internalised in Nigeria's political culture. They are scarcely taught, let alone debated, in the public square.

Furthermore, to practice democracy effectively, Africans need to evolve—not just as political subjects, but as moral agents. In other words, a period of cultural and intellectual renaissance is a must. Africa, Nigeria included, must undergo its own Enlightenment, akin to Europe's experience in the 17th and 18th centuries. This means fostering critical thinking, institutional trust, public reasoning, and civic values.

For those who understand where Black Africa—Nigeria in particular—truly stands today, there is a grim realisation that this is a tall order. It is even arguable whether it is possible in the foreseeable future.

Yet, acknowledging this hard truth may be the first step toward developing an indigenous political framework that works, rather than borrowing forms that do not fit our realities.